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A COMPARATIVE FAULT DEFENSE IN
CONTRACT LAW
Ariel Porat*
This Article calls for the recognition of a comparative fault defense
in contract law. Part I sets the framework for this defense and sug-
gests the situations in which it should apply. These situations are
sorted under two headings: cases of noncooperation and cases of
overreliance. Part II unfolds the main argument for recognizing the
defense and recommends applying the defense only in cases where
cooperation or avoidance of overreliance is low cost.
INTRODUCTION
In the 1970s, the comparative fault defense ("CFD") in tort law began to
spread across the United States,' about thirty years after it became prevalent• 2
in the United Kingdom. Both legislatures and courts throughout the United
States adopted this defense, with the latter applying it in tort cases on a daily
basis. Today, few will call for the restoration of the doctrine that preceded it:
the contributory negligence defense. That defense enabled courts to either
impose full liability on the injurer (when there was no contributory negli-
gence) or leave the burden of harm completely on the victim's shoulders
(when there was contributory negligence). The CFD rejects this binary ap-
proach to fault, instead allowing apportionment of damages between the
injurer and the contributorily negligent victim.
Over the years, the CFD has spread into the contract law of many coun-
tries (such as Canada, the United Kingdom, and Israel), albeit primarily in
cases where a party breached a contractual duty of reasonable care or in
cases of concurrent tort and contract liability.3 Yet the same shift has been
slow to occur in American contract law.4
* Alain Poher Professor of Law, Tel Aviv University and Fischel-Neil Distinguished Visit-
ing Professor, the University of Chicago Law School. I thank Oren Bar-Gill, Omri Ben-Shahar,
Melvin Eisenberg, Roy Kreitner, Timna Porat, Avraham Tabbach, Shine Tu, and Omni Yadlin for
helpful discussions and comments and Dana Rothman-Meshulam for superb language editing. I also
thank Adrienne Fowler and Daniel Rathbun from the Michigan Law Review for their very able edito-
rial assistance.
1. 1 DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 201 (2001). Dobbs also notes that several states
had adopted it earlier. Id.
2. W.V.H. ROGERS, WINFIELD & JOLOWICZ ON TORTS §§ 6.38-6.41 (16th ed. 2002).
3. See, e.g., LAW COMM'N, CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AS A DEFENCE IN CONTRACT
para. 1.4 (1993).
4. For refusal to apply the CFD to contracts, see Fortier v. Dona Anna Plaza Partners, 747
F.2d 1324 (10th Cir. 1984). For willingness to apply the defense to contracts, see American Mort-
gage Inv. Co. v. Hardin-Stockton Corp., 671 S.W.2d 283 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984). There is an increasing
1397
Michigan Law Review
This Article calls for a reversal of this state of affairs and for the recog-
nition of a CFD in American contract law.5 Part I begins by presenting the
nature and scope of the advocated CFD. It also illustrates the categories of
cases to which it should apply: cases where (1) efficiency requires that the
promisee take steps during performance to reduce the probability of a
breach (to cooperate) or to reduce his potential losses (to avoid overreli-
ance), and (2) the cooperation or avoidance of overreliance is low cost. Part
II unfolds the main argument for applying the defense in American contract
law. It argues that the CFD is warranted because it would provide the pro-
misee with incentives to cooperate and rely efficiently, while at the same
time maintaining incentives for the promisor to perform the contract even if
the promisee failed to fulfill his part. The CFD would also encourage the
promisor to efficiently reduce the need for the promisee's cooperation and
avoid overreliance, thereby decreasing the losses from failure to cooperate
or avoid overreliance.
I. THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE COMPARATIVE FAULT DEFENSE
The CFD should be available to a breaching party ("promisor") against
an aggrieved party ("promisee") when the latter's fault has contributed to his
own losses. The promisee should be considered "at fault," and should shoul-
der part of the loss, when he fails to meet a legal burden to reduce his
potential losses by cooperating with the promisor or avoiding overreliance.
Below, I present eight categories of cases in which the promisee should be
considered at fault and a CFD applied. These are sorted under two headings:
cases of noncooperation and cases of overreliance. In all eight categories,
efficiency requires the promisee to take steps either to reduce the probability
of breach or otherwise reduce his potential losses, and prevailing contract
law mostly fails to provide him with adequate incentives to do so.
A. Noncooperation
In the cases that can be classified as instances of noncooperation, the
promisee fails to take steps to prevent or reduce the likelihood of breach
during performance. Example 1 presents the case where a promisee fails to
assist in performance by act or omission. Example 2 presents the case where
a promisee could have reasonably prevented the breach by clarifying the
promisor's legal rights and duties under the contract for her. In Example 3,
the promisee fails to provide the promisor with information necessary for
performance, while in Example 4 he fails to inform the promisor of the high
willingness to apply the CFD to implied-warranty cases. See I JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S.
SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 11-8, at 758-460 (5th ed. 2006); infra notes 19-21 and
accompanying text.
5. For my earlier arguments calling for the adoption of the CFD by Commonwealth and
European countries see Ariel Porat, Contributory Negligence in Contract Law: Toward a Principled
Approach, 28 U. BRIT. COLUM. L. REv.141 (1994) (focusing primarily on contract law in England,
Canada, Australia, France and Germany). The efficiency argument that is the subject of Part H of the
current paper was not made in the earlier paper.
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potential losses he would incur in the event of breach. In both cases, the
failure to provide information contributes to the breach of the contract. In
the fifth and final example, the promisee is responsible for creating appre-
hensions that he will not perform, thereby inducing the promisor to breach.
Example 1. Failing to assist in performance. A undertakes to construct a
building for B. During the last stage of performance, B gives A's employees
confusing instructions on the construction work required. In the end, there is
a delay in the completion of performance; moreover, some of the construc-
tion work is found to be defective. Had B refrained from instructing A's
employees, the contract would have been adequately performed.
6
Prevailing contract law would take a binary approach to such situations:
either A or B would shoulder any losses due to nonperformance in their en-
tirety. The choice between the two alternatives would hinge on the
interpretation of the contract.7 Courts rarely opt for an intermediate solution
that apportions damages between the parties.8
Example 2. Failure to clarify misunderstandings. A is a subcontractor
and B is a primary contractor. They enter a contract for A to perform con-
struction work and for B to pay installments at different stages of the work.
At a certain point in time, A argues that she has reached one of these pay-
ment stages and is therefore entitled to an installment. In fact, A is not
entitled to any payment, because she failed to meet an additional condition
stipulated by the contract. A is not aware of this additional condition be-
cause of an oversight on her part. B refuses to pay, stating that he is not
obliged to do so under the contract, but B provides no other explanation. A
then stops her work, causing loss to B. Only after a month, during which B
stubbornly refuses to meet with A, does B explain to A why she was not en-
titled to payment.
Traditional contract law would impose liability on A since she breached
the contract. The fact that B could have easily clarified the misunderstanding
and prevented the breach is seen as irrelevant: after all, B is not A's legal
advisor, and it is A's responsibility to fulfill her obligations under the con-
tract. Under a different approach, which finds some support in the case law,
when one party is aware of the other party's ignorance of his legal rights and
duties and can easily clarify them, he is under obligation to do so. B would
not be allowed to take deliberate advantage of A's oversight, and he could
not recover for A's breach.9 The CFD is a third option: in this type of case, it
would make both A and B responsible for the losses.
6. This example is an adaptation of Lesmeister v. Dilly, 330 N.W.2d 95 (Minn. 1983), in
which the court apportioned damages between the parties.
7. E.g., AMPAT/Midwest, Inc. v. Ill. Tool Works Inc., 896 F.2d 1035, 1041 (7th Cir. 1990)
(Posner, J.) ("The parties to a contract are embarked on a cooperative venture, and a minimum of
cooperativeness in the event unforeseen problems arise at the performance stage is required even if
not an explicit duty of the contract."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. d (1981)
(asserting that noncooperation could be considered a breach of the duty of good faith).
8. Lesmeister, 330 N.W.2d at 102.
9. Mkt. St. Assocs. Ltd. P'ship v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588, 594 (7th Cir. 1991). In this case, one
party refused to fulftil her duties and the other party could have easily corrected the mistake. Id. at
June 20091 1399
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Example 3. Failure to provide information necessary for performance.
A, a contractor, and B, the owner of a certain piece of land, enter a contract
for the performance of construction work. Due to geological difficulties,
there is a delay in performance that causes B substantial losses. It becomes
evident, however, that B knew about these obstacles at an early stage (al-
though not prior to entering into the contract with A). Had he revealed this
to A in due time, the delay could have been prevented.
Contract law imposes a limited duty of disclosure at the contract forma-
tion stage.1° In shaping this duty, courts balance the interest the party
possessing information has in using it for his own benefit against the interest
the other party has in not being misled.
Traditional American contract law does not impose any duty to disclose
information at the performance stage. However, one might expect an even
broader disclosure duty at this stage: disclosing the information necessary
for performance, especially when it is costless (or nearly so), increases the
surplus of the contract without distributional effects. As I argue in Part II,
under certain conditions, applying the CFD is a better solution than impos-
ing a duty of disclosure.
Example 4. Failure to warn of a high potential loss. A, a carrier, under-
takes to ship a crank shaft from B's mill for repair and to bring it back in
one week's time. A instead brings the shaft back after two weeks, which
results in high consequential losses to B, who could not find a substitute
shaft. At the time of contracting, the parties were aware of a small risk that a
substitute shaft would not be available. A week later it had become clear to
B, but not to A, that this risk had materialized. Had B conveyed this informa-
tion to A on time, A would have taken costly precautions to ensure that he
would return the shaft on time, thus preventing the breach."
Under the Hadley v. Baxendale principle, A would be liable for B's
losses, since the unavailability of a substitute shaft was foreseeable at the
time of contracting. Yet, had B informed A of his potentially high losses
when he realized that a substitute shaft was not available, the inefficient
breach would have been avoided. 2 One way to provide promisees with in-
centives to convey such information would be to deprive B of his entitlement
596-97. In reversing summary judgment, Judge Posner ruled that the contracting parties bore a duty
not to take deliberate advantage of each others' oversights concerning their rights and duties under
the contract. Id. at 597-98.
10. For an overview of the duty of disclosure generally, as well as a more specific discussion
of the role of efficiency and morality in shaping this duty, see Melvin A. Eisenberg, Disclosure in
Contract Law, 91 CAL. L. REv. 1645 (2003).
1I. The inspiration for this example is, of course, Hadley v. Baxendale, (1854) 156 Eng.
Rep. 145.
12. The following illustrates numerically the principles behind Example 4: assume at the
time of contracting that the probability of losing $1000 was 0.1, yielding an expected loss of $100,
but that a week after contracting, the probability of loss increased to 1, yielding an expected loss of
$ 1000. Assume now that by investing $500 in precautions, A could prevent the breach. So long as A
assumes the expected loss to be $100, he won't make this investment, whereas if he is aware that it
has risen to $1000, he will. Since efficiency requires making the investment, efficiency also dictates
that B should convey the information regarding his high potential loss to A.
1400 [Vol. 107:1397
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to damages. 3 A less extreme approach would be to make the CFD available
to A and reduce his liability accordingly.
4
Example 5. Creating apprehensions. B constructs a building for A. At a
certain point in time, B brings heavy equipment to the construction site and
places it on a concrete floor that was poured only a few days earlier. At A's
request, the equipment is removed to avoid damaging the floor. A suspects
that it is already damaged, however, and demands its replacement. B refuses.
A forbids B from continuing the construction work, and both suffer losses. It
later becomes evident that the concrete floor was not damaged and that B's
placement of the heavy equipment on the floor was no more than a minor
breach that did not warrant A's repudiation. It also becomes evident that B
could have assured A that the floor was not damaged or, alternatively, that it
would be repaired if necessary. Had B provided such assurances, A would
not have repudiated."
Under traditional contract law, A should be found liable for breach of
contract-her suspicions of damage are her own problem and do not affect
B's rights and duties under the contract. In contrast, the modem approach, as
reflected by the Restatement, allows a party who has reasonable grounds to
suspect that the other party will not perform his or her contractual obliga-
tions to demand adequate assurance of due performance. If the party fails to
provide assurances, the requesting party can treat the contract as having
been repudiated. 6 The Restatement does not explicitly discuss cases in
which the apprehensive party responds by breaching the contract (as in our
example). However, there is an implicit assumption that that party would be
considered in breach and liable for the ensuing consequences. As Part II
explains, a better solution for Example 5 would be apportionment of dam-
ages under the CFD.
B. Overreliance
There are three categories of cases that can be classified as instances of
overreliance-where efficiency would have required the promisee to restrain
his reliance, but he failed to do so. In the sixth example, the promisee
13. Others have supported the use of this solution in analogous cases. See Melvin A.
Eisenberg, The Duty to Rescue in Contract Law, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 647, 670-72 (2002); Charles
J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Mitigation Principle: Toward a General Theory of Contractual
Obligation, 69 VA. L. REV. 967, 1012-14 (1983).
14. Another situation in which the Hadley v. Baxendale principle would allow recovery, and
where applying the CFD could be valuable, is one in which the high potential losses are foreseeable
(objectively) but unforeseen (subjectively) by the promisor at both the time of contracting and later
on. Here, too, if the promisee realizes during performance that the promisor is unaware of the high
potential loss entailed by a breach, efficiency requires conveying the information to the promisor.
The CFD would provide incentives to achieve this result.
15. This example is an adaptation of Carfield & Sons, Inc. v. Cowling, 616 P.2d 1008 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1980). There, the court stated that in order to avoid liability, "[A] was obligated to request
adequate assurance of performance. If [B] then refused to provide that assurance, [A] could treat the
contract as terminated." Id. at 1010.
16. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 251 (1981).
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engages in reliance despite knowing the promisor will likely breach. In the
next example, the promisee has no concrete reason to suspect an imminent
breach, but his reliance prior to the breach is nonetheless unreasonable. In
the last example, the promisee unreasonably assumes that the contract was
performed and thus fails to minimize his expected losses.
Example 6. Failure to restrain reliance in the face of a concrete risk of
breach. A agrees to sell his house to B. As the time of delivery of possession
approaches, there are signs of a substantial risk that A will not make timely
delivery because A's lessee is refusing to vacate the premises. Even though
B is well aware of this risk, he enters into a contract with a contractor to
refurnish the house starting on the day set for delivery. He also incurs ex-
penses advertising the house for rent. In the end, A breaches due to late
delivery, and B suffers losses due to forfeiting the contractor's deposit and
his advertising expenses. These losses would have been prevented had B
waited to see whether the contract would be adequately performed.
Assuming the expected losses of reliance exceeded the expected gains of
reliance, B's reliance on the contract was unreasonable. But since contract
law does not sanction for overreliance, B could externalize his costs and
internalize his gains. Consequently, the risk that he would overrely was a
substantial one. Note that Example 6 is not a case of anticipatory breach,
where the mitigation of damages defense would apply 7 and thus provide
efficient incentives for B to restrain his reliance. In situations represented by
Example 6, then, the application of the CFD would unambiguously improve
B's incentives relative to those currently provided by contract law. The CFD
would also be superior to the mitigation of damages defense, as will be ex-
plained in Part II.
Example 7. Failure to restrain reliance when there is no concrete risk of
breach. A undertakes to guard B's house, where valuable goods are stored.
However, B fails to activate the alarm system. A breaches the contract by
neglecting to guard the house. As a result, thieves steal B's goods and inflict
bodily injury on B. Had B activated the alarm system, all losses would have
been prevented. B also could have taken other precautionary measures to
reduce the risk of theft.
8
Even if B had no concrete reason to suspect that A would breach the
contract, it could still have been unreasonable for B to rely only on A for
protection. To determine whether his reliance was unreasonable, it is neces-
sary to consider the value of the assets, the risk of theft and bodily injury,
the capabilities of A as a guard, the cost of additional precautionary meas-
ures and their effectiveness, and so on. Applying the CFD if B's reliance was
unreasonable would provide incentives to similarly situated promisees to
make reasonable efforts to protect their property. Conditioning A's liability
17. Id. § 350 cmt. f.
18. The High Court of Australia considered a similar situation. While refusing to apply the
CFD to contracts, it maintained that "[a] plaintiff may be guilty of contributory negligence ... even
if the 'very purpose' of the duty owed by the defendant is to protect the plaintiff's property."
Astley v. Austrust Ltd. (1999) 197 C.L.R. 1, 14.
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on B's activating the alarm system or taking other precautionary measures
would be an inefficient solution, as will be clarified in Part II.
Example 8. Relying on the mistaken belief that the contract has been
adequately performed. A constructs a heating system for B's business. The
heater malfunctions due to A's failure to fulfill her contractual obligations,
and B suffers property losses. As a result of these losses, B is unable to per-
form third-party contracts and suffers additional losses. A few hours prior to
the malfunction, there were signs of something going wrong. A reasonable
person could have inferred the impending malfunction and taken steps to
avoid losses.' 9
Here, as in the sixth and seventh examples, the mitigation of damages
defense does not apply because B was not aware of the breach at the rele-
vant points in time. 0 The CFD provides a compromise between the two
extreme solutions of either A or B bearing all the losses. And indeed, some
courts have allowed the defense in similar situations-as when the promisor
breached an implied warranty and consequential losses ensued."
I. THE ARGUMENT FOR ADOPTING THE COMPARATIVE FAULT DEFENSE
A. Setting the Stage
The most significant argument against recognizing the CFD in American
contract law is that it would impair the promisee's reliance and planning
abilities. 2 Were the CFD applicable, the argument runs, the promisee could
no longer be certain of full compensation for an unfulfilled contractual
promise. He could no longer "sit and wait" until the promisor fulfilled her
contractual obligation, but would have to assist, supervise, and take precau-
tionary measures with regard to either the other party's performance or his
own potential losses.
In the analysis below, I posit that under certain conditions, most contrac-
tual parties would benefit ex ante from the availability of a CFD, making it
an efficient default rule for contract law. If my argument holds, the reliance
and planning argument unravels: even if the promisee's ex post reliance and
planning abilities are impaired, this does not justify rejecting the CFD since
it is consistent with both parties' ex ante interests.
19. This example is an adaptation of Signal Oil & Gas Co. v. Universal Oil Prods., 572
S.W.2d 320 (Tex. 1978). In that case, the plaintiff suffered losses due to a fire from a malfunctioning
heater. Id. at 323. The defendants, who had manufactured, designed, and installed the heater, were
found liable for breach of implied warranties of fitness and suitability. Id. at 329. The court applied
the CFD and reduced damages, finding that the plaintiff had been contributorily negligent in not
shutting down the heater despite warnings of the impending hazard. Id.
20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 350 cmt. f.
21. See, e.g., Karl v. Bryant Air Conditioning Co., 331 N.W.2d 456 (Mich. 1982) (applying a
comparative fault defense); Signal Oil & Gas Co., 572 S.W.2d. 320 (same).
22. See LAW COMM'N, supra note 3, paras. 4.5-4.7; Ariel Porat, Note, The Contributory
Negligence Defence and the Ability to Rely on the Contract, 111 LAW Q. REV. 228 (1995).
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My analysis assumes the following sequence of events: first, the pro-
misee observes the behavior of the promisor or some part of it; second, the
promisee responds by taking or not taking steps to cooperate or avoid over-
reliance; third, the promisor observes the response of the promisee; and
fourth, the promisor responds by performing or not. The analysis also as-
sumes that the relevant behaviors are verifiable-in other words, that they
can be proven in court. Finally, it is assumed that renegotiation is costly and
the parties would prefer their rights and duties to be regulated from the out-
set.23
B. Noncooperation
1. When Should Cooperation be the Default Rule?
Below, I argue that cooperation should be the default rule where coop-
eration is low cost. But before explaining why, let me clarify what I mean by
"costs of cooperation" and by "high-cost" and "low-cost" cooperation.
Costs of cooperation do not refer only to the costs of executing the coopera-
tion; they also include the costs associated with monitoring the promisor's
performance to anticipate a need to cooperate, as well as the costs necessary
to infer from the circumstances that a need to cooperate arose. The two lat-
ter costs are often far more substantial than the former type, as most of the
examples discussed in Section L.A illustrate. Thus, in Example 2 (clarifying
misunderstandings), the promisee's costs of clarifying for the promisor that
she was about to breach the contract were close to zero; however, in order to
know that such a clarification was needed, the promisee would have had to
monitor the promisor's behavior and infer such a need when it arose. These
costs of monitoring performance and inferring a need to cooperate, even if
not high, are not nil.
There is no bright-line rule for distinguishing between high-cost and
low-cost cooperation. While it is relatively easy to conceive of the two
poles, it is difficult to draw the line between them. The costliness of coop-
eration is certainly a function of the surplus created by the contract:
cooperative efforts that are high cost in the context of a contract for renting
an apartment could be low cost in the context of a contract for performing a
huge construction project. For the purposes of this Article, I define "low-
cost cooperation" as any cooperation that a reasonable person would not
consider to materially affect the division of the contract surplus. I define all
other forms of cooperation as "high cost."
23. When noncooperation or overreliance is not observable or verifiable, other mechanisms
can be employed to provide both parties with efficient incentives. See, e.g., Robert Cooter & Ariel
Porat, Anti-insurance, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 203 (2002) (proposing a mechanism for creating full
liability for both the promisor and promisee that would result in efficient incentives for both).
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a. High-Probability, High-Cost Cooperation
When the parties to a contract anticipate a high probability that the pro-
misor will need the promisee's cooperation during performance and the
costs of cooperation are high, they tend to address this need in their contract.
The parties can set either a burden or a duty of cooperation for the promisee,
so that noncooperation will result in deprivation of the promisee's entitle-
ment to damages (a burden) or the promisee's liability for the promisor's
losses (a duty). In contrast, silence on this matter can indicate that the par-
ties did not intend to impose a high-cost burden or duty of cooperation on
the promisee, at least when the parties anticipate that the need for the pro-
misee's cooperation is highly probable.
But the question arises whether, in order to save transaction costs, there
should be a default rule imposing a burden or duty of cooperation when the
need for cooperation is highly probable and cooperation is high cost and
efficient. I believe that the answer is no.
First, it is often hard to know whether the parties would have pre-
ferred high-cost cooperation and, if so, to what extent. Occasionally,
different modes of cooperation are available, and there is no clearly
preferable choice among them. Moreover, the need to cooperate and the
efficiency of doing so could be debatable and could fluctuate from case
to case.24
Second, when cooperation is high probability and high cost, it becomes
part of the substance of the exchange. From both positive and normative
points of view, default rules do not and should not regulate the substance of
the exchange but only its ancillary terms; the substance of the exchange
should be left for the parties to regulate.
Third, on many occasions the promisee could refuse to undertake a
burden or duty of high-cost cooperation--or the parties could deem it inef-
ficient-because of the parties' asymmetric information and control
regarding the conditions relevant to cooperation. Typically, the promisor
knows more than the promisee about the promisor's ability to perform and
about her expected need for the promisee's cooperation. The promisor will
try to underestimate the likelihood of this need arising while negotiating
the contract, and the promisee, well aware of this fact, will be reluctant to
bear a burden or duty of high-probability and high-cost cooperation. But
more importantly, in addition to possessing better information, the promi-
sor often has better control over the conditions giving rise to a need for
cooperation. Knowing that the promisee bears a burden or duty to cooper-
ate, the promisor may try to manipulate the promisee or to maneuver
events so that greater cooperation is required than efficiency would
24. The parties will sometimes prefer to leave the question of cooperation open for future




dictate.25 Often, such inefficient behavior is unverifiable and therefore can-
not be deterred2 6
All three of these reasons are compelling grounds for a default rule un-
der which there is no burden or duty of high-cost cooperation where the
need for it is highly probable, instead leaving the parties to regulate coop-
eration as they see fit.
27
b. Low-Probability, Low-Cost Cooperation
However, a different situation arises when one or more low-probability
contingencies that require low-cost cooperation are expected to transpire.
Regulating any low-probability contingency by contract yields high, even
prohibitive, transaction costs for the parties, thereby encouraging them to
leave many contingencies unregulated. When the potential cooperation is
low cost, the argument that default rules should not regulate the substance of
the exchange also collapses: it is precisely in such cases that default rules
are most needed. And the above-discussed issue of asymmetric information
and control over the circumstances giving rise to the need of cooperation is
decidedly less acute. Therefore, given that specific low-cost cooperative
behavior on the part of the promisee is typical in many contractual settings,
it is desirable to shape a clear default rule regulating such behavior. The five
categories of cases represented by the five examples discussed in Section
L.A could set the framework for five sets of default rules regulating repeat
low-cost and efficient cooperative modes of promisee behavior.
Example 1 (assistance) can be used to illustrate this. In that example, the
owner failed to cooperate by issuing confusing instructions. While not nec-
essarily costless, cooperation would not have been high cost. But many
parties would not regulate such contingencies when the default rule is non-
cooperation. Even when cooperation is efficient, regulating these kinds of
contingencies would involve high transaction costs that the parties would
not willingly shoulder. A default rule encouraging cooperation would be
desirable in such cases. And the same conclusion holds with respect to the
other examples presented in Section I.A. In most of those examples, a sub-
stantial part of the cooperation costs were not related to executing the
cooperation, but rather to monitoring the promisor's performance and infer-
ring from the circumstances that cooperation was needed. The latter types of
costs are typically "fixed." The promisor's manipulations and maneuvers
25. Sometimes the parties may overcome this hurdle by imposing a duty (or burden) of co-
operation on the promisee and a duty for the promisor to compensate the promisee for his costs. But
since this solution could only work for some cases (for example, it would not work when transaction
costs involved in measuring the costs of cooperation and in transferring payments for cooperation
are high), it cannot serve as a default rule.
26. In different terminology, under certain circumstances the promisee can be the cheapest
cost avoider of the breach, while the promisor is the cheapest cost avoider of the circumstances
giving rise to the need to avoid the breach.
27. For a general argument against cooperative default rules in contracts, see Robert E. Scott,
A Relational Theory of Default Rules for Commercial Contracts, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 597 (1990).
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cannot significantly affect the magnitude of fixed costs, so the promisee will
be more willing to bear them in the first place. Therefore, in Examples 1
through 5, and especially when most of the cooperation costs are fixed, effi-
ciency mandates that the promisee assume a burden or a duty of
cooperation.
c. High-Probability, Low-Cost Cooperation
The crucial need for a default rule favoring low-cost cooperation when it
is unlikely to be needed does not preclude a default rule requiring low-cost
cooperation when it is likely to be needed. Indeed, even for high-probability
contingencies, a default rule could operate efficiently by reducing the par-
ties' transaction costs. Suppose that in Example 5 (apprehensions), the
parties anticipate a high probability that the owner will be uncertain, at dif-
ferent stages of the work, as to whether performance is adequately executed,
but that assurance of performance will not be high cost. With a default rule
of noncooperation, the parties will probably regulate cooperation in their
contract for such a contingency. However, a cooperation default rule would
save them the transaction costs of negotiating and drafting a contract provi-
sion.
d. Low-Probability, High-Cost Cooperation
The case of low-probability, high-cost cooperation is different, mainly
because of the above-mentioned problem of asymmetric information and
control. A burden or duty of cooperation could spur the promisor to take
advantage of the promisee by creating conditions in which cooperation is
required too often and inefficiently. The fact that cooperation is high cost
could provide good grounds for rejecting a rule of cooperation from the out-
set.28
2. The Remedy
One way to encourage low-cost cooperation in the cases depicted by Ex-
amples 1 to 5 is to impose a duty of cooperation on the promisee-or a full
burden of cooperation, which has a similar effect when he is the only party
expected to incur losses-so that if he fails to fulfill his duty, he will shoul-
der all losses from a breach. When the promisee expects to internalize the
entirety of the costs stemming from his inefficient noncooperation, he will
tend to cooperate. But there is still a flaw in this solution: it provides no in-
centive for the promisor to perform efficiently if the promisee fails to
cooperate. In an ideal world, if the promisee expected to internalize all the
costs of his inefficient noncooperation, he would always cooperate effi-
ciently; but in our non-ideal world, he will often fail to do so. The parties
28. But if most of the costs are fixed and their magnitudes are not dependent on the promi-
sor's behavior, a different conclusion could be warranted. See supra Section I.B.I.b.
June 20091 1407
Michigan Law Review
may therefore be willing to give the promisor incentives to perform in the
event that the promisee fails to cooperate. But placing full liability (or full
burden) on the promisee will not achieve this goal.
Just as full promisor liability creates a moral hazard for the promisee,
full promisee liability creates a moral hazard for the promisor. Example 3
(providing information necessary for performance) can illustrate such an
outcome. In that example, the owner failed to convey geological information
to the contractor. It could still have been efficient to perform on time with-
out knowledge of this information. But if the contractor knew that the owner
would bear all the losses because he had failed to inform her, she might inef-
ficiently refrain from performing on time.
The CFD could solve this problem. Since the defense apportions dam-
ages between the parties, it leaves substantial incentives for the promisor to
perform even when the promisee has failed to cooperate. Thus, in Example
3, the contractor would have incentives to perform on time even if she did
not receive the information at an early stage and even if she knew of the
promisee's omission. These incentives are admittedly imperfect since the
CFD forces the promisor to bear less than the amount of the full losses gen-
erated by the breach. But, given the importance of the promisee's
cooperation, this is a price worth paying.
There is yet another cost of using the CFD over a duty (or full burden)
of cooperation: the loss of perfectly efficient incentives for the promisee to
cooperate (which exist when he fully internalizes all the costs of the
breach). However, this cost is trivial in the context of low-cost cooperation,
where much less than the threat of full liability is necessary to induce the
promisee to cooperate. In such cases, it is typically sufficient to threaten the
promisee with an expected burden (or liability) that is higher than his costs
of cooperation even if it is much lower than the costs of noncooperation.
Using Example 3 to demonstrate this, much less than the threat of full liabil-
ity is necessary to induce the owner to convey the geological information to
the contractor. 29 Granted, there is still the potential for strategic behavior on
the part of the promisee: aware that the promisor has sufficient incentives to
perform even if cooperation is not rendered, the promisee may choose from
the outset not to cooperate. But this is not a major concern. As illustrated by
Examples 1 to 5, the promisee typically knows there is significant risk that
the promisor will not perform in the absence of cooperation. In light of this
knowledge and given the low-cost burden of cooperation, the promisee will
cooperate because he expects to bear part of his losses. To illustrate with
Example 3, the risk that the owner will not convey the geological informa-
tion to the contractor to save cooperation costs is very low. He must realize
that the failure to convey this information would not only make performance
more costly, but could also lead to a breach with him facing part of the con-
sequences.
29. But sometimes the promisee may refrain from cooperating to induce a breach and find a
way out of the contract; placing an expected burden on him, equivalent to the costs of cooperation,
would not be sufficient to deter him efficiently.
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In addition to providing efficient incentives for the promisee to cooper-
ate and for the promisor to perform when the promisee fails to cooperate,
the CFD offers at least one other important advantage over a duty or full
burden rule. It provides the promisor with more efficient incentives to re-
duce the expected losses from breach before the need for cooperation arises,
which is crucial because of the promisor's superior information and control
over the circumstances giving rise to the need for cooperation. If the pro-
misee bears all the costs of noncooperation (as a duty rule would mandate),
then the promisor will covertly, inefficiently, and too often create situations
in which the promisee is required to cooperate. Given that cooperation is
low cost, it would seem this is an insignificant risk. But since the outcome is
sometimes a high-cost failure to cooperate, reducing the probability of the
need to cooperate-even if cooperation is not high cost-could be cost justi-
fied. The CFD, as opposed to its alternatives, provides incentives for the
promisor not only to perform when cooperation has been withheld, but also
to reduce the need for cooperation in the first place.3°
The following numerical example illustrates the incentivizing effects of
the CFD in such situations. Assume that, without cooperation, the probabil-
ity of breach is 0.5, and the loss the promisee is expected to incur due to the
breach is $80, yielding an expected loss of $40. Also assume that, with the
promisee's cooperation, which costs him $2, the probability of breach is
expected to be reduced to 0.25, with losses remaining at $80, thereby yield-
ing expected losses of $20. Under such circumstances, cooperation is
efficient. If the CFD is applied and the promisee failed to cooperate and a
breach occurred, it would be sufficient that he be made to bear only $5 of
the total $80 loss. This would create an ex ante threat of $2.50 for the pro-
misee (0.5 -$5) and would induce him to cooperate from the outset. At the
same time, it would leave most of the costs of the breach to be borne by the
promisor. This would typically provide her with sufficient incentives to effi-
ciently perform if the promisee failed to cooperate and to reduce the need to
cooperate in the first place.
To conclude, in cases of low-cost cooperation, noncooperation should
lead to reduced damages under the CFD. Ideally, from an efficiency per-
spective, this reduction should be no more than the minimum amount
necessary to provide the promisee with incentives to cooperate.
30. Note that instead of leaving some unrecoverable losses on the promisee's shoulders (as
the CFD mandates), the law could also make him liable for some of the promisor's losses (as though
the promisor and promisee were both responsible for the breach and its consequences). However,




1. When Should Avoiding Overreliance be the Default Rule?
a. High-Probability, High-Cost Avoidance of Overreliance
When overreliance is anticipated at a high level of probability and its
avoidance is high cost,3 the parties are expected to regulate the extent of
reliance in the contract if they want it controlled at all. They can regulate it
directly when overreliance is verifiable or indirectly when it is not. Indirect
regulation can take the form of a liquidated-damages clause that sets the
damages the promisee is entitled to in the event of breach. In such a case,
the promisee would internalize both the costs and benefits of his reliance
and would rely efficiently.32 A default rule regulating reliance is not suitable
where overreliance is highly probable and avoiding that overreliance is high
cost, for the same reasons that a default rule is not suited for regulating
high-probability, high-cost cooperation cases."
b. Low-Probability, Low-Cost Avoidance of Overreliance
In cases of low-probability, low-cost avoidance of overreliance, how-
ever, a default rule that encourages efficient reliance could be justified. 34 Let
us return to Example 6 (concrete risk of breach). There could be many con-
tingencies in which a risk of breach on the part of the seller of the house
could emerge. Regulating each and every such contingency would entail
high transaction costs, and most parties would not even attempt to do so.
Thus, developing default rules adapted to various types of overreliance
could be the best solution. Examples 6 to 8 could serve as paradigmatic cas-
es from which more detailed and nuanced default rules could evolve.
c. Other Situations in the Avoidance of Overreliance
So as to avoid unnecessary repetitiveness, I will not discuss at any length
the desirability or undesirability of setting a default rule for cases of high-
31. The distinction between high-cost and low-cost overreliance is analogous to that applied
to high-cost and low-cost cooperation. See supra Section ll.B. 1.
32. See Robert Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution, 73
CAL. L. REV. 1, 14-15 (1985). Note that this solution does not work for noncooperation cases. On
handling overreliance, see Richard Craswell, Performance, Reliance, and One-sided Information, 18
J. LEGAL STUD, 365, 367-68 (1989), which suggests a rule under which the promisor would state
the probability of a breach and on which the promisee would rely accordingly. For various doctrines
in prevailing contract law that reduce overreliance, see George M. Cohen, The Fault Lines in Con-
tract Damages, 80 VA. L. REV. 1225 (1994).
33. See supra Section I.B.l.a.
34. For the argument that overreliance is not a severe or prevalent problem in contract law,
see Melvin A. Eisenberg & Brett H. McDonnell, Expectation Damages and the Theory of Overreli-
ance, 54 HASTINGs L.J. 1335 (2003). But note that Eisenberg and McDonnell consider the cases
represented by Example 6 to be "out of the realm of overreliance." Id. at 1346.
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probability, low-cost avoidance of overreliance and for cases of low-
probability, high-cost avoidance. The arguments regarding the desirability
of default rules in the corresponding contexts of cooperation apply here as
well. It suffices to say that a default rule for high-probability, low-cost
avoidance of overreliance would be efficiency-justified since it would save
transaction costs; in contrast, a default rule for low-probability, high-cost
avoidance of overreliance would be unwarranted because of the promisor's
superior information and control.35
2. The Remedy
One way to encourage low-cost avoidance of overreliance would be to
deprive the promisee of damages for the reliance losses he inefficiently in-
creased or failed to reduce. The buyer in Example 6 (concrete risk of
breach), for example, would not be compensated for his deposit or his ad-
vertising costs because they resulted from unreasonable reliance. This
solution is tantamount to applying the mitigation of damages defense at the
stage before a known breach transpires. It is flawed, however, in that it
would reduce the promisor's incentives to perform efficiently: she would
know that she would not have to shoulder any of the promisee's overreliance
losses. In Example 6, given the buyer's overreliance, efficiency requires that
the seller take extra steps to deliver on time. But if the seller knows she is
exempt from any liability for the buyer's overreliance losses, she will make
less-than-efficient efforts to perform.
By contrast, applying the CFD would result in a reduction of the pro-
misee's damages for losses resulting from his overreliance. This would
provide the promisee with efficient incentives to undertake low-cost avoid-
ance of overreliance. No less important, it would create greater incentives
for the promisor to perform efficiently when there is a known risk of or tan-
gible promisee overreliance. Relative to situations in which the promisor
shoulders all of the losses, as is the case under prevailing contract law, the
CFD would create somewhat weaker incentives for the promisor to perform
efficiently. But this is a price worth paying to improve the promisee's incen-
tives to avoid overreliance, a point well illustrated by Example 6. Under the
CFD, the buyer would be expected to bear some of the advertising costs and
the cost of the forfeited deposit. This would provide him with incentives to
delay reliance until he saw whether the contract was performed on time. But
if the buyer were to inadvertently overrely, the seller would have incentives
to take extra precautions, ensure timely performance, and prevent overreli-
ance losses.36
35. See supra Section l.B.1.d.
36. Knowing the chance of performance increases if he overrelies, the promisee may in-
crease his reliance even more when the promisor is aware of his overreliance. This possibility
notwithstanding, when avoidance of overreliance is low cost and the risk of breach is significant in
spite of his overreliance, the promisee will prefer to restrain his reliance.
1411June 20091
Michigan Law Review
As was the case with noncooperation, the asymmetry in information and
control over the conditions generating a need to avoid overreliance also pro-
vides reasons to prefer the CFD over a rule that leaves all overreliance costs
on the promisee's shoulders. Unlike that latter rule, the CFD induces the
promisor to reduce the need to avoid overreliance. The advantage to this is
that it ameliorates the risk of high-cost overreliance, which can result when
the promisee fails to avoid overreliance."
In sum, in cases of low-cost avoidance of overreliance, like in cases of
low-cost cooperation, the CFD is preferable to a binary approach that leaves
one party with the entire burden of loss. Here as well, from an efficiency
perspective, the burden borne by the promisee should amount to no more
than the minimum necessary to provide him with incentives for efficient
reliance.
CONCLUSION
This Article calls for recognition of a comparative fault defense in
American contract law. It presents the categories of cases to which this de-
fense should apply and argues that a precondition for its application is low-
cost promisee cooperation or low-cost promisee avoidance of overreliance.
Other relevant factors affecting the desirability of the CFD include (1) the
benefit to be derived from the expected cooperation or avoidance of overre-
liance, (2) the extent of asymmetry in the information and control the parties
wield over the conditions giving rise to the need to cooperate or avoid over-
reliance, and (3) the probability of that need arising. The higher the benefit
from cooperation or avoidance of overreliance, the less asymmetry in infor-
mation and control, and the lower the probability of the need to cooperate or
avoid overreliance materializing, the stronger the case for the CFD.
While the Article does not present an in-depth consideration of the crite-
ria for apportioning damages under the CFD, the discussion does imply that
courts should assign the promisee no more than the minimum burden neces-
sary to efficiently induce him to cooperate or avoid overreliance. This would
often result in imposing a greater share of losses on the promisor.
38
Only forty years ago, American tort law was governed by a binary ap-
proach to liability and a comparative fault defense had yet to be recognized.
Courts and legislatures rightly changed that. The same should be done in
contract law.
37. This argument seems to be more persuasive in the context of Example 6 than in Exam-
ples 7 and 8, since asymmetric information and control are more prevalent in the former.
38. This is the outcome when cooperation or avoiding overreliance is low cost and the prob-
ability of a breach without cooperation or avoidance of overreliance is high. See supra Section
H.B.2 (providing a numerical example).
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